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This paper evaluates a criticism of the claim that within a fully just liberal egalitarian society 
it would be permissible to pay special incentives to its more productive members. The 
envisaged basis for these payments is that the incentives are grounded on reasonable, agent-
centred, ethical prerogatives on the part of the agents concerned as defended in Scheffler’s 
hybrid ethical theory. [Scheffler, 1994] 
 
This paper picks up one thread of G. A. Cohen’s complex and multifaceted critique of the 
apparent permissibility, within a fully just Rawlsian society, of such incentives. [Cohen, 
1995a; 1995b; 1997; 2001] One very popular and plausible line of response to Cohen’s 
critique is that it is internally inconsistent precisely because it is put forward alongside an 
acknowledgement of the possibility of an agent-centred prerogative that offers a rationale for 
incentive payments. [Estlund, 1998; Williams, 1998; Daniels, 2003; Tan, 2004] Cohen’s 
argument has, therefore, been subject to a slippery slope objection: if he concedes the 
existence of some incentive payments grounded on the reasonable, agent-centred, 
prerogatives of individuals, then he must, his critics argue, concede the full range required to 
justify special incentives even within a fully just society. It seems to me that Cohen’s 
strongest line of response to this purported slippery slope argument is that there is an 
ambiguity in the idea of the determination of the scope of a prerogative. I will try and 
develop this line of argument on his behalf before ultimately finding fault with it. 
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1 WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
 
The controversy over whether liberal egalitarianism is compatible with the payment of 
special incentives to the better off has focused on Rawls’s difference principle. In a much 
discussed series of papers, Cohen has argued that while this principle is an acceptable 
justification of inequality, it has to be supplemented by an egalitarian ethos if it is not to 
sanction incentives that motivate in “the wrong way”. He argues that those who are sincerely 
committed to the difference principle would not need such incentives, whereas those who 
need such incentives are not genuinely committed to the difference principle. Incentives are 
motivationally redundant. 
 
At this point it is easy to misunderstand Cohen’s objection. Some have taken his view to be a 
critique of “the rich” having the temerity to offer a moral justification for driving a hard 
bargain when confronted by the demands of “the poor”. To see why that is a mistake, here is 
the correct version of the argument, given by Joshua Cohen: 
 
 
In the case of genuine incentive demands, people would genuinely prefer not to 
deploy their scarce, productive talents unless they are compensated at a level that 
turns out to be higher than the average compensation of others. Consider a doctor 
who is perfectly able to doctor for the median wage of (say) $30, 000, and would 
live at least as well as everyone else if she did, but really values writing literary 
fiction and is therefore unwilling to doctor for less than $100, 000. Contrast this 
case with the doctor with scarce surgical talents who would fully willingly use 
them for $30, 000 if she thought she could not get more for doctoring, but knows 
that others are willing to pay more than that, and bargains to capture more than 
the reservation wage for which she would be entirely willing to work. The latter 
case seems very important in the world, but the former presents the philosophical 
problem that occupies me here. [J Cohen, 2001, p.4]  
 
 
The issue is not the opportunity for those who are talented and effortful to drive the hardest 
bargain. That would make no sense as a critique of Rawls. It would represent the better off as 
public Rawlsian contractualists and private Hobbesian contractarians, professing high 
egalitarian Rawlsian ideals in public while secretly trying to drive as hard a bargain as 
possible in the marketing of their labour. But in Rawls’s view, it is the position of the worst 
off that has to be maximised and anyone better off is permitted to do better if that does not 
worsen the position of the worst off. [Williams, 1995; Van Parijs, 2003] “Genuine incentive 
demands”, as Joshua Cohen calls them, involve the marketing of scarce talent at above 
average compensation, not the maximising of compensation. 
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2 PURISM, RIGORISM AND PREROGATIVE BASED INCENTIVES 
 
Jerry Cohen’s argument is open to some unwelcome interpretations, unwelcome to everyone, 
including Cohen himself. It seems to leave no room for special incentives grounded on 
reasonable ethical prerogatives. The purist interpretation of the argument implies that those 
with scarce talents and a capacity for effort do not require any further incentive at all. Simply 
being talented and effortful is reward in itself and one’s proper attitude is gratitude that one 
is able to do more for the collectivity (and thereby do more for the worst off) by being able 
to make a larger contribution than others. This reading of Cohen’s argument points to what 
looks like the discounting of “special incentives” entirely in some formulations of his 
argument.1 
 
Cohen concedes that this purism is unreasonably demanding and says the same for what I 
will call the rigorist interpretation. The rigorist interpretation takes Cohen’s argument to be 
that everyone’s personal decisions to market his or her labour should aim directly at the 
benefit of the worst off group of people. People have no discretion in their economic 
decisions to market their labour. They must willingly accept the “strains of commitment” 
involved in always aiming directly at improving the situation of the worst off group in any 
distribution. The objection to such rigorism is that it is not only unreasonably demanding; it 
may also be economically inefficient and reduce the aggregate resources available for 
distribution.2 Rawls claims, on the contrary, that his understanding of the difference principle 
factors in economic efficiency. [Williams, 1995, 1998; Van Parijs, 2003] However, in 
making this concession does Cohen fatally undermine his own view? 
 
3 ARE COHEN’S ARGUMENTS INCONSISTENT? 
 
The difficulty for Cohen is that he can see the problems with the purist and rigorist 
interpretations and explicitly argues that he wants to permit reasonable ethical incentives so 
as to avoid them. [Cohen, 1995b, pp.302-303, p.314]  But this, so his critics argue, leads to 
the internal collapse of Cohen’s argument.3 [Estlund, 1998; Williams, 1998; Daniels, 2003; 
                                            
1 As a representative passage, see Cohen 1995b, pp. 336-337. This interpretation remains compatible 
with Cohen’s concession that incentives may be necessary to reward work that is particularly difficult, 
dangerous or lacks intrinsic rewards of its own. Such “compensatory incentives” fall outside the scope 
of Cohen’s critique while special incentives remain compromised. 
2 An anonymous referee for Ethics and Economics asked why this view is unreasonably demanding 
“if the fulfilment of the demand could not result in anyone’s becoming any worse off than those 
worst-off individuals whose position is maximised?” A good question, but I take it the answer rests on 
the empirical argument that this form of rigorism is inefficient. It thereby reduces the overall level of 
resources and so worsens everyone’s absolute position including that of the relatively worst off. 
3 The referee for this journal was concerned about this issue of attribution, questioning whether 
Estlund et al. were correct to attribute this view to Cohen. Actually, what one finds in Cohen is an 
acceptance that the Estlund argument is a good argument (so a tacit admission that it has picked up on 
a genuine aspect of Cohen’s own view?) combined with a denial that Estlund is merely expounding a 
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Tan, 2004] They make two critical points: that once Cohen has conceded the existence of 
agent-centred prerogatives, they can be used to ground special incentives. The second 
objection is that in order to block this inference from permissible prerogatives to special 
incentives, Cohen needs to implement his egalitarianism via invasive detailed information 
about individual motivation. In summary, his argument is both impracticable and ignores an 
important requirement of publicity on a conception of justice.4 I will consider these 
arguments in more detail. 
 
David Estlund argues that once Cohen has conceded the existence of reasonably grounded 
ethical prerogatives, it is difficult to see where one draws the line. [Estlund, 1998] Cohen, 
after all, permits a limited degree of ethically grounded “self interest” or self-regarding 
behaviour. If so, then how can he object to a person not working for more than average 
compensation to respect the ethical demands of friends, partners, children and siblings? Or to 
that person not working directly to secure the maximal position of the worst off because he 
or she owes some particular person a duty of reparation after having wronged him or her? If 
these ethically grounded agent-centred prerogatives make incentive payments ethically 
unobjectionable, where does one draw the line between such incentives and those to which 
Cohen morally objects? We can reasonably predict that it will be unclear exactly which 
incentives are morally tainted and which are not given the complexity of the ethical 
prerogatives that underlie them. 
 
Andrew Williams concurs, but adds a further consideration that the relevant class of choices, 
like detailed motivations in wage bargaining, are simply unfeasible from an informational 
point of view for the purposes of a theory of justice. [Williams, 1998] Accurate and detailed 
information about such choices is difficult to obtain (and I would add intrusive and likely to 
violate a liberal right to privacy).5 That is why such decisions have to fall outside the basic 
structure, whereas rules implementing a conception of justice, as Williams points out, have 
to be public in Rawls’s sense of being based on verifiable facts and commonly known. 
 
The core issue here about prerogatives is a slippery slope argument: once Cohen has 
conceded some ethical prerogatives, his critics claim that there is no natural stopping point. 
That general charge seems to me unfair. I think Cohen raises interesting issues about how we 
limit the scope of prerogatives in general that offer him a (limited) means of rebutting this 
criticism. While I will ultimately find reason to disagree even with this revised argument, I 
do think Cohen’s position is subtler than his opponents have hitherto taken it to be. 
                                                                                                                           
position found in Rawls. “I believe that I would accede to some, if not all, of Estlund’s criticism … I 
am, however, fairly confident that the interesting position he develops is not, as he thinks it, entirely 
consistent with Rawls’s view, but a substantial revision of it, a kind of halfway house between 
Rawls’s view and my own.”, Cohen, 2000 p.213, note 36. (So “Rawlslund” can join “Kripkenstein” as 
a Meinongian subsistent entity.) 
4 I would note in passing that the practical and moral difficulties of establishing such fine grained 
information about individual choices is my concern about the distinction between endogenous and 
exogenous comparative advantage in the interesting arguments of Peter Dietsch, 2005, this journal. 
5 Andrew Williams focuses on the practicality of violating the publicity constraint in his well known 
“basic structure” response to Cohen in Williams, 1998; in Thomas, unpublished, 2005b, I focus on the 
violation of the liberal right to privacy involved in rejecting the publicity constraint. 
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4 THE LIMITATION ON THE EXERCISE OF PREROGATIVES ARGUMENT 
 
The best way, it seems to me, of avoiding Estlund’s and Williams’s criticisms is by blocking 
the claim that conceding any prerogative is going to lead to a rationale for all incentives. I 
think the best response available to Cohen is as follows: those committed to the difference 
principle and to paying incentives to those who would like to market their scarce talents at 
above the average market rate are committed to subsidising the cost of that free choice.6 
They are also committed to subsidising, at some cost to the overall level of resources, 
various agent-centred prerogatives with an ethical basis. But an agent’s discretion in 
exercising this prerogative must itself be tempered. 
 
The idea, then, is this: a person’s agent-centred prerogative gives him or her a certain 
discretion to give undue weight to his or her own interests in the determination of outcomes 
and actions. However, the exercise of this prerogative ought to be tempered by the 
comparative distance between the better off and the worst off.7 Those who are much better 
off than the worst off have increasingly less of a case for incentivising payment as the gap 
between the two parties widens. Thus, while the difference principle permits the payment of 
incentives, the degree of justification that it offers is variable. In particular, the greater the 
relative gap between a worst off person and a better off person, the less justification the 
better off person has in fully exercising his or her prerogative. A person’s discretion ought to 
be tempered by a background commitment to an egalitarian ethos. Discretion can be more or 
less tempered in its operation.  
 
Therefore, if the gap between a representative well off person and a representative badly off 
person is comparatively small then the former has more of a reasonable claim to 
incentivising payment than if the gap is comparatively large. As the gap widens so the claim 
that incentivising payments are reasonable decreases. This proposal would, I submit, pass the 
test of feasibility as it is most likely that in a fully just Rawlsian society the difference 
principle would be implemented by a minimum wage payable to those who meet the 
description that is true of the representative worst off person, and that wage would be 
commonly known by all such that the better off could hardly deny that they know exactly 
how much better off they would be in the envisaged outcome. [Schaller, 1998; Van Parijs, 
2003] 
 
                                            
6 A focus on “freedom of occupation protected by the liberty principle” is central to Alex Voorhoeve’s 
paper in this journal, Voorhoeve, 2005 and is also assumed by MacLeod, 2005, this journal, on 
grounds of autonomy. 
7 As Roger Crisp pointed out to me, this would make Cohen’s position similar to certain kinds of 
prioritism. For one possible rationale for this view of internally qualified prerogatives, one could cite 
Colin MacLeod’s observation that “although differences in individual choices can justify economic 
inequalities, the magnitude of the inequalities generated via differences in individual choices should 
be roughly commensurate with reasonable assessments of the relative significance of different 
choices.”, MacLeod, 2005, this journal.  
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5 THE LIMITATIONS ON PREROGATIVES ARGUMENT EVALUATED 
 
How successful is this new argument that I have attributed to Cohen? He explicitly states an 
analogy between his view and a hybrid ethical theory, but in fact it seems to me that he is 
even worse off than a hybrid theorist in qualifying the “strains of commitment”. To see why, 
one has to focus on the ambiguity that Cohen exploits in how one determines the scope of 
prerogative. In the case of ethics Scheffler offers a person a choice: one is always permitted 
to bring about the best outcome impartially considered. But one is also permitted to bring 
about the outcome judged best from the standpoint of one who exercises a prerogative in a 
way that reflects the pervasive importance of the personal point of view. [Scheffler, 1994]  
That prerogative is weighted: it operates within the ratio determined by contrasting the two 
evaluations and their disproportion, namely, the difference between the evaluation of the 
outcome from the “objective” and “subjective” points of view.8 [Scheffler, 1994]  
However, while Scheffler explains how to limit the scope of an agent’s prerogative he does 
not limit its exercise. He sets upper and lower limits to one’s discretion but does not 
constrain its exercise within those limits.9 The view I have attributed to Cohen does precisely 
that. It limits not only the scope of a prerogative but also its exercise. This shifts the whole 
argument on to the new and interesting issue of the acceptability of such an internal 
qualification to the exercise of a prerogative. Clearly influenced by Cohen, Thomas Nagel’s 
sceptical verdict on the feasibility of Rawlsian egalitarianism settles for a second best 
solution that is ethos based, and seems to appeal to a similar internally qualified self-restraint 
on the part of the better off: 
 
 
Those who hope for something more in the long run must consider the second 
option – a psychological and institutional transformation which would permit 
innovation and co-operative production without generating substantial 
inequalities of reward …. the change of attitude that suggests itself, one that 
would be far more egalitarian and more in line with the traditional ideals of 
socialism, is a development of a general reluctance on the part of members of the 
society to be conspicuously better off than others …. and a corresponding 
disapproval of those who try to make themselves better off…. [Nagel, 1991 
p.165]10 
 
 
                                            
8 This general view of how one determines such a prerogative is criticised in Thomas, 2003, pp. 267 - 
271 and Thomas, 2005a, pp. 9 - 10.  
9 I don’t have the scope to defend this interpretation here, but it seems to follow directly from the 
thought that the scope of a prerogative is fixed by the disproportion between two distinct evaluations. 
These two evaluations will, of course, co-incide if the agent concerned is an ideally consequentialist 
agent whose personal point of view consists in the view that she ought to be “objective” and set aside 
her personal point of view. But I take it this limiting case is not, in fact, the kind of case that gives 
hybrid theory its rationale. 
10 Nagel describes this envisaged transformation as “highly unlikely”, Nagel, 1991 p. 165. 
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The envisaged restraint here is clearly based on a social ethos; it seems to me that there is 
scope for reasonable disagreement here as to whether this proposal could work. I am not 
convinced that we can understand agent-centred prerogatives in the way that Cohen invites 
us to do so. The interpretation of Cohen’s argument that I have set out involves giving a 
person a prerogative and then tempering its exercise. However, it does so in a way inimical 
to the very idea of a prerogative. It seems to me that discretion on a sliding scale is not 
discretion at all. Prerogatives, I would argue, are of their very nature unfettered in their scope 
and in their exercise.  If one does not have an absolute discretion, but a discretion marked off 
in degrees weighted by considerations of one’s distance from the resources of the worst off, 
then the better off might reasonably protest that moral rigorism was back, but in a 
particularly subtle form. In exercising that which is allegedly his or her prerogative based 
discretion a better off person must constantly bear in mind the relative distance between 
herself and the worst off. While this is a feasible proposal it still seems to me unreasonably 
demanding and a resurrection of a subtle moral rigorism “of second order”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In my view there is a hidden subtlety in Cohen’s discussion of incentives that allows him to 
avoid the charge that his defence of those incentives sustained by reasonable agent-centred 
prerogatives undermines his whole critique of special incentives. He can avoid the slippery 
slope objection. Ultimately, however, I conclude that this interpretation of Cohen’s argument 
collapses back into the rigorist argument it tried to avoid. Nevertheless, it does seem to me 
that Cohen has raised an important issue here about which reasonable people may disagree: 
to what extent is a limitation on the exercise of an internally qualified prerogative too 
demanding? I have offered one response to that question, but it seems to me that the real case 
for Cohen’s critique of special incentives will contest precisely this point and that this further 
argument has yet to be made.11 
 
                                            
11This paper is excerpted from a longer paper, a work in progress, whose provisional title is ‘Cohen’s 
Critique of Rawls: A Double Counting Objection’, listed as Thomas 2005b above. For detailed 
comments on the longer paper that have indirectly benefited this excerpted version, I am grateful to 
Kathryn Brown, Roger Crisp, Peter Dietsch and Helen Frowe. For helpful questions about this 
excerpted paper I am grateful to the anonymous referee for this journal. I am grateful to Peter for his 
invitation to contribute to this symposium and to Walter Schaller and Kok-Chor Tan for the trouble 
they took in kindly sending me offprints of their papers.  
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